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a b s t r a c t
We propose an evolutionary game to ∧analyse the dynamics of tolerance among heterogeneous economicagents. We show that: (i) intolerance is much more persistent than tolerance; (ii) a fully tolerant society
assures prosperity; (iii) cultural integration should precede economic integration.
© 2013 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction1
In this paper, we ∧analyse how tolerance, which we define as2 a generic ability to accept diversity, is affected by wealth distri-3
bution between two economically interacting social groups. As4
pointed out by Tabellini (2010) and Florida (2004), intolerant be-5
haviour affects economic growth and social development by reduc-6
ing trust and cooperation among economic agents, obstructing the7
free movement of ideas and talents and ∧favouring corruption and8 political patronage.9
Furthermore, Bjornskov (2004) discusses the importance of in-10
dividuals’ tolerance for economic growth, showing that inequality11
reduces growth but mainly in societies where people perceive it12
as being relatively unfair. However we ascertain a substantial lack13
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of theoretical economic models about the determinants and social 14
dynamics of tolerance. To the best of our knowledge, one of the 15
first theoretical papers on this topic is Corneo and Jeanne (2009). 16
The authors propose a theory of tolerance using the approach of 17
symbolic values inwhich benevolent parents select their children’s 18
values. They argue that society may be trapped in an intolerant 19
equilibrium; moreover, moving from an intolerant to a tolerant 20
society would increase aggregate income. Correani et al. (2010) 21
propose an overlapping generations model, showing that the in- 22
centives that influence descendants’ predisposition to tolerance 23
depend on both institutional factors, where behaviour is imposed 24
by rules and social (or cultural) factors. The authors confirm the 25
absolute impossibility of affirming tolerance through formal rules. 26
Intolerance is a persistent attitude and its control requires con- 27
tinuous interventions on the educational processes of new gen- 28
erations. Recently, Muldoon et al. (2011) ∧have developed two 29models of rational motivation for toleration. Key to the first model 30
is an application of David Ricardo’s theory of trade and his re- 31
lated notion of comparative advantage. In their second model the 32
authors assume one-on-one interactions between members of a 33
0165-1765/$ – see front matter© 2013 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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Table 1
Payoffs of the interaction. The heading of the∧table points to tolerant (xi) and intolerant (xˆi) agents of group i. The genericcouple (ai, aj) describes the payoffs of the agents in the i-th row and j-th column.
x1 xˆ1 x2 xˆ2
x1 π11, π11 π11, π11 π12 − (α1 + c1), π21 − (α2 + c2) 0, 0
xˆ1 π11, π11 π11, π11 0, 0 0, 0
x2 π21 − (α2 + c2), π12 − (α1 + c1) 0, 0 π22, π22 π22, π22
xˆ2 0, 0 0, 0 π22, π22 π22, π22
society, where the successful establishment of a link between two1
agents is constrained by their level of tolerance. The principal find-2
ings of Muldoon et al. (2011) are that individuals should be ratio-3
nally motivated to become more tolerant, but only under specific4
conditions. First, ∧heterogeneity in the population is necessary; sec-5 ond, individuals must have some material interests; third, agents6
must have a relatively small number of the skills available in the7
society.8
The mathematical model developed in the present article re-9
lates to the literature on the evolution of social preferences (Bisin10
and Verdier, 1998, 2001; Pichler, 2010) and is a natural continu-11
ation of economic studies on fundamentalism (Iannaccone, 1997;12
Arce and Sandler, 2003, 2009; Epstein and Gang, 2007) and socialQ213
tolerance (Corneo and Jeanne, 2009; Correani et al., 2010;Muldoon14
et al., 2011). To assess the evolution of tolerance in ∧society, we use15 the replicator dynamics (Weibull, 1998), which implicitly assumes16
that tolerant and intolerant behaviour spreads on the grounds of17
a selection process: the behaviour (strategy) that gives a higher18
payoff tends to spread in the society. We introduce a random pair-19
wise matching where two randomly selected agents are involved20
in an economic transaction (for example a working relationship or21
a business deal) which produces an amount of wealth that is as-22
signed to the agents on the grounds of their initial economic con-23
tribution. Substantially, we assume that a group (group 1) is richer24
than the other and an agent of group 1 gives a greater contribution25
in producing wealth than the poorest agent of group 2.26
Obviously, the economic transaction is strongly affected by the27
type of agents involved in it (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000) and, in28
particular, it is not carried out if the actors are agents of different29
groups and at least one of them is intolerant; as a matter of fact,30
a fully tolerant society is a Pareto dominant equilibrium, allowing31
the highest production of wealth.32
The model produces a large number of different scenarios, but33
only in one case tolerance is a globally stable steady state, confirm-34
ing the empirical evidence that intolerance is much more com-35
mon and persistent than tolerance (Corneo and Jeanne, 2009). In36
particular, we will show that the selection process of dominant37
behaviour is strongly affected by wealth distribution and agents’38
perception of cultural differences among social groups. In other39
words, as stated in the empirical analysis of Becchetti et al. (2007)40
‘not only growth but also the distribution of growth dividends mat-41
ters’ for the diffusion of tolerance. Notably, we find that, even as-42
suming an identical initial capital endowment of the two groups43
(economic integration), the hypothesis of fairness in the alloca-44
tion of wealth produced with the economic interaction implies the45
dissemination of intolerance. Thus, tolerance requires persisting46
differences in the distribution of produced wealth (group 1 should47
remain richer than group 2). This strange phenomenon is less48
prominent if an agent’s perception of diversity is less marked, that49
is if cultural integration between the two groups is reinforced.50
These theoretical results suggest that cultural integration should51
precede economic integration.52
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follow.53
Section 2 describes the model and discusses the main results. Sec-54
tion 3 analyses the welfare implications of the evolutionary dy-55
namics of social tolerance. Section 4 contains our conclusions and56
provides prospects for further research.57
2. The model 58
We assume that a population of N economic agents is divided 59
∧into two differentiated groups. Differences, such as ethnicity, reli- 60gion, country of origin and social class are almost immediately rec- 61
ognizable. We indicate with Ni the number of members of group i, 62
for i = 1, 2 and N1+N2 = N . The cardinality of each group is sup- 63
posed large enough, i.e. Ni > 1, for each i = 1, 2. For the sake of 64
simplicity, Ni is assumed to be constant in time, i.e. ∧populations do 65not grow ∧or decrease. Each individual can be tolerant or intolerant 66towards the agents of the opposite group. We also assume that the 67
percentage of ∧tolerance varies in time. Let 0 ≤ x
t
i ≤ 1 be the share 68
of tolerant agents in group i at time t . In order to simplify our anal- 69
ysis, the explicit reference to time will be omitted whenever pos- 70
sible. Society is shared among tolerant and intolerant individuals: 71
2
i=1
xiNi +
2
i=1
xˆiNi = N, (1) 72
where xˆi = 1− xi, for i = 1, 2. 73
Let us suppose that agents interact after being randomly 74
matched, obtaining payoffs constant in time according to Table 1. Q3 75
In general, πij > 0 is the gain obtained by an agent of group 76
i when she interacts with an agent of group j. When interac- 77
tion involves two agents of the same group, each of them obtains 78
πii > 0 irrespective of their real attitude (tolerance or intolerance). 79
The interaction between agents of different groups is more com- 80
plex because their attitude to accept diversity can affect the out- 81
come of the transaction. Indeed, by definition, intolerance rules out 82
any interaction with the agents of different groups. The intolerant 83
individual ‘builds’ around her an exclusive network of relations ex- 84
cluding all the individuals of the other groups; therefore, we con- 85
clude that interaction does not occur if the involved actors belong 86
to two different groups, and if one of them is intolerant. In this case 87
each agent gains 0.1 Tolerance, here, is the willingness to engage 88
with others, regardless of their ideological commitments. When 89
interaction involves tolerant agents of two different groups i and 90
j they respectively obtain, πij − (αi + ci) and πji − (αj + cj). More 91
specifically, anyone who ∧accepts interacting with an agent of the 92rival group sustains both a ∧psychological cost αi in terms of loss of 93identity (see Akerlof and Kranton, 2000) and a social cost ci paid 94
by the agents because their behaviour is disapproved of by intol- 95
erant individuals. The psychological cost αi is assumed to depend 96
on the payoff πii, i.e. αi = αi(πii) with ∂αi/∂πii > 0. Social costs 97
depend on the level of tolerance measured by the shares x1 and x2; 98
we assume the function ci = βci (x1, x2) , i = 1, 2, β > 0, with the 99
following properties2: 100
1 However, an agentwho is highly intolerant of othersmay partner with an agent
that she is intolerant of, but we assume that the relationship will be strained and
less fruitful than amore amicable partnership: also in this casewe assume that each
agent gains 0 (see Muldoon et al., 2011).
2 As in Muldoon et al. (2011) we propose individuals’ rational self-interest and
social diversity as the motivators for tolerant/intolerant behaviour, and social cost
allows us to take into account the role played by inter-group differences such as
religion or ethnicity, which cannot be captured by only considering pure economic
incentives. In linewithAlesina and La Ferrara (2005), ‘contacts across different types
of agents produce negative utility’.
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(1) ∂ci
∂x1
< 0, ∂ci
∂x2
< 0;1
(2) ∂
2c1
∂x21
≥ 0, ∂2c2
∂x22
≥ 0;2
(3) ∂
2c1
∂x1∂x2
≤ 0, ∂2c2
∂x2∂x1
≤ 0;3
(4) ci = 0 if x1 = x2 = 1.4
Condition (1) states that the individual cost increases when the5
∧share of intolerant people ∧increases, while by condition (2) the6 higher the share of tolerant people in the agent’s group, the lower7
the reduction in the cost generated by an increase in such a share.8
Condition (3) states that the social cost reduction produced by an9
increase in the share of tolerant individuals in the agent’s group10
increases with an increase in the share of tolerant individuals of11
the other group. This means that the incentive to tolerance grows12
as the opposite group becomesmore tolerant, i.e. tolerance ismuch13
more rewarding if it is reciprocal. Finally, condition (4) states that14
individual social costs are zero if there are no intolerant people in15
both groups.16
The parameter β ≥ 0 may be viewed as a measure of intol-17
erants’ ‘fundamentalism’; when β is high, intolerant agents are18
strongly adverse to the members of the other group and the in-19
dividual social costs deriving by mixed interaction are high.20
Let Pxixj the probability that a tolerant agent of group i interacts21
with a tolerant agent of group j, Pxi xˆj the probability that a toler-22
ant individual of group i meets an intolerant individual of group23
j, Pxˆixj the probability that an intolerant member of group i meets24
with a tolerant member of group j and Pxˆi xˆj the probability that an25
intolerant of group imeets an intolerant of group j. We obtain the26
following probabilities:27
Px1x1 =
x1N1 − 1
N − 1 , Px1 xˆ1 =
xˆ1N1
N − 1 ,28
Px1x2 =
x2N2
N − 1 , Px1 xˆ2 =
xˆ2N2
N − 1 ,29
Pxˆ1x1 =
x1N1
N − 1 , Pxˆ1 xˆ1 =
xˆ1N1 − 1
N − 1 ,30
Pxˆ1x2 =
x2N2
N − 1 , Pxˆ1 xˆ2 =
xˆ2N2
N − 1 ,31
Px2x2 =
x2N2 − 1
N − 1 , Px2 xˆ2 =
xˆ2N2
N − 1 ,32
Px2x1 =
x1N1
N − 1 , Px2 xˆ1 =
xˆ1N1
N − 1 ,33
Pxˆ2x2 =
x2N2
N − 1 , Pxˆ2 xˆ2 =
xˆ2N2 − 1
N − 1 ,34
Pxˆ2x1 =
x1N1
N − 1 , Pxˆ2 xˆ1 =
xˆ1N1
N − 1 .35
Now, in order to provide more intuitive insights into the dynam-36
ics of tolerance, we will give an explicit shape of the cost function,37
supposing that:38
ci(x1, x2) = β(1− x1x2) (2)39
αi(πii) = πii. (3)40
Given the above probabilities the expected payoffs of tolerant and41
intolerant individuals in group i are, respectively:42
E[xi] = πii

Pxixi + Pxi xˆi
+ πij − πii − β(1− xixj) Pxixj , (4)43
and44
E[xˆi] = πii

Pxˆixi + Pxˆi xˆi

, (5)45
for i, j ∈ {1, 2}with i ≠ j.46
To study the evolutionary dynamics of tolerancewewill use the 47
theory of replicators (Weibull, 1998). ∧N being very large, we will 48consider the version of the replicator which is related to an infinite 49
population. This is a simplifying assumption, which has the good 50
feature to provide amore intuitive andmeaningful economic anal- 51
ysis. The motion of tolerant population in group 1 with respect to 52
time t will be then∧modelled by the following differential equation: 53
x˙1 = x1xˆ1

E[x1] − E[xˆ1]

. (6) 54
By repeating the same procedure for group 2, we can obtain a sec- 55
ond differential equation that, along with Eq. (6), produces a sys- 56
tem of two differential equations giving a complete description of 57
tolerance dynamics: 58
x˙1 = x1xˆ1x2N2N − 1 [π12 − π11 − β (1− x1x2)] ,
x˙2 = x2xˆ2x1N1N − 1 [π21 − π22 − β (1− x1x2)] .
(7) 59
The dynamics is assumed to start at an initial state

x01, x
0
2

. 60
By applying Eq. (6), we have that the trajectories described in 61
(7) are always into the phase plane: 62
F = xt1, xt2 : 0 ≤ xt1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ xt2 ≤ 1, ∀ t > 0 , 63
for every starting point

x01, x
0
2
 ∈ F and time t ≥ 0. 64
By solving (7), we derive the steady states of the dynamical 65
system set on the boundaries of the phase plane F : 66
P1 = (0, ψ) ; ψ ∈ (0, 1] ;
P2 = (ξ , 0) ; ξ ∈ (0, 1] ;
P3 = (1, 1) ;
P4 = (0, 0) ;
P5 =

1,
π22 − π21 + β
β

;
P6 =

π11 − π12 + β
β
, 1

(8) 67
and all the steady states (x1, x2) within the phase plane F , ∧deriv- 68ed by calculating the intersection of the isokine curves3 x2 = Q4 69
π11−π12+β
βx1
≡ Ω1 and x2 = π22−π21+ββx1 ≡ Ω2 with xi ≠ {0, 1} i = 70
1, 2 that is: 71
P7 = {(x1, x2) : x1 ∈ (0, 1) , x2 ∈ (0, 1) , Ω1 = Ω2} . (9) 72
The steady states have a precise economic and social meaning. 73
Points P1 and P2 depict situations where one group (respectively 74
group 1 and group 2) is wholly populated by intolerant agents. 75
Point P3 is the most preferable situation, given that all population 76
agents are tolerant and social conflicts are absent;∧in contrast, point 77P4 depicts a society characterized by totally intolerant agents. Fi- 78
nally, ∧at points P5 and P6 the population of one group is completely 79tolerant while, ∧at point P7, tolerant and intolerant agents exist in 80both social groups. The point P3 is of particular interest for our pur- 81
pose being such a steady state related to the case of full tolerance. 82
We will focus ∧our attention on it. 83
3 Isokine curves are obtained by imposing
π12 − π11 − β (1− x1x2) = 0;
π21 − π22 − β (1− x1x2) = 0,
with x1 ∈ (0, 1) and x2 ∈ (0, 1).
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d e f
Fig. 1. Phase diagrams 1: (a) γ1, γ2 ∈ (0, 1) and γ1 < γ2; (b) γ1 = γ2 = γ ∈ (0, 1); (c) γ1, γ2 ∈ (0, 1) and γ1 > γ2; (d) γ1 < 0, γ2 ∈ (0, 1); (e) γ2 < 0, γ1 ∈ (0, 1); (f)
γ1 < 0, γ2 < 0.
g
l m
h i
Fig. 2. Phase diagrams 2: (g) γ1 ∈ (0, 1), γ2 ≥ 1; (h) γ2 ∈ (0, 1), γ1 ≥ 1; (i) γ1 ≥ 1, γ2 ≥ 1; (l) γ1 > 1, γ2 < 0; (m) γ2 > 1, γ1 < 0.
The following facts will turn out to be useful:1
1. if at a given time t we have xt2 > Ωii = 1, 2 then x˙i > 0;2
2. if x2 = 1 and x1 > π11−π12+ββ ≡ γ1 then x˙1 > 0;3
3. if x1 = 1 and x2 > π22−π21+ββ ≡ γ2 then x˙2 > 0.4
Phase diagrams 1 and 2 show all possible scenarios ∧for the dynam-5 ics of tolerance.More specifically, Phase∧Diagram1 exhibits the en-6 tire range of opportunities inwhich trajectories can converge to the7
point (1, 1) of full tolerance when P3 is a stable equilibrium. Phase8
∧Diagram 2 shows all the opportunities when the point (1, 1) is9
unstable. If we observe phase diagrams,we can notice that a neces- 10
sary condition in order to say that tolerance spreads in both groups 11
is γi < 1, ∀i = 1, 2. Such a condition is not sufficient because con- 12
vergence towards the equilibrium point (1, 1) is possible only for 13
sufficiently high value of x0i , for i = 1, 2.4 14
4 In line with Muldoon et al. (2011) we observe that a ‘uniformly intolerant
society will have a hard time becoming less intolerant, precisely because there are
no examples of tolerance to learn from’.
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Phase ∧Diagram 1 also shows that only in panel (1f )with γi < 01 convergence to the point (1, 1) is realized for any starting point2
different from the equilibria in the phase plane F .3
Condition γi < 1 is verified if and only if πij − πii > 0 ∀i, j ∈4
{1, 2} and i ≠ j. Therefore, the spread of tolerance is wider when5
the payoffs obtained in mixed interactions are higher than the6
payoffs resulting from the interactions between two members of7
the same group.8
This fact forces us to give a more comprehensive description9
of payoffs; to be more precise, we assume that every interaction10
between two agents of groups i and j produces aggregate wealth11
Rij

ki, kj

that is distributed between them and then consumed.12
The producedwealth depends on the (physical and human) capital13
contributed by both agents. If the two agents are members of the14
same group, they dividewealth equally. If they aremembers of two15
different social groups, produced wealth is not equally divided. In16
this case we call the shares of wealth of the group imember ∧δi and17
∧the share of the other one δj = 1− δi. More precisely, we suppose18 that δi depends on the relative contribution of capital ki, namely19
δi ≡ kiki+kj . A different portion of wealth can be justified assuming20
differences in group productivity or different initial (human and21
physical) capital∧endowments.
5 We∧assume thatmembers of groupQ522 1 are in general richer thanmembers of group 2 so that 12 < δ1 < 123
and given that R12 = R21 ≡ R2 payoffs become:24 
π11 = 12R11; π12 = δ1R2,
π22 = 12R22; π21 = (1− δ1)R2,
(10)25
where R11 > R2 > R22 > 0. The analysis of the phase diagrams26
and the payoff structure in (10) gives the following result:27
Proposition 1. The necessary condition in order that tolerance28
spreads in both groups is δ1 ∈ [Ψ1,Ψ2], where Ψ1 ≡ 12 R11R2 and ∧Ψ2 ≡29
1− 12 R22R2 .30
Proof. From system (7) we observe that x˙1 > 0 and x˙2 > 0 require31
respectively π12 > π11 and π21 > π22. Using payoffs in (10) we32
obtain δ1 > 12
R11
R2
from the first condition and δ1 < 1− 12 R22R2 from33
the second one. 34
Remark 1. Note that Ψi > 12∀i ∈ {1, 2} but it is not necessarily35
true that Ψ1 < Ψ2. More precisely 12 < Ψ2 < 1 and Ψ1 >
1
2 .36
Furthermore, from (10) it is easy to show that:37
Ψ1 < Ψ2 iff R11 < 2R2 − R22, (11)38
from which we derive the following results:39
Corollary to Proposition 1.40
1. Tolerance is impossible if Ψ1 > Ψ2 for any δ1 ∈ [0, 1]. R2 is not41
sufficiently high and, therefore, there is no economic incentive42
to mixed interaction.43
2. Imposing fairness in the allocation of wealth R2 (i.e. if δ1 → 12 ),44
reduces the level of tolerance.45
5 These hypotheses are reasonable if, for example, we consider a group of natives
owning most of the production factors and a group of migrants with low skills
(Darity et al., 2006; Hazari and Sgro, 2003; Moy and Yip, 2006) or if we assume
that ∧‘‘one racial group has racial privilege in exercising control over both publicand private resources while members of the other groups do not have such power’’
(Darity et al., 2006).
SinceΨ1 > 12 , Proposition 1 ∧gives that a necessary condition for 46the spread of tolerance is δ1 > 1/2. The borderline case of δ1 = 47
1/2 is associated with fair distribution of wealth R2. Hence, 48
γ1 > 1 and γ2 < 1, and the system is that reported in panels 49
∧2(h) and 2(l), where the equilibrium (1, 1) with full tolerance 50is clearly unstable. Given that R11 > R22, when δ = 1/2 the 51
agents of group 1 have no economic incentive to cooperatewith 52
the agents of group 2. 53
3. If there are no differences in productivity between the groups, then 54
R11 = R22 = R2 and intolerance spreads. 55
With R11 = R22 = R2 we have Ψ1 = Ψ2 and at least one group 56
(group 1 if δ1 < 12 , as in panel ∧2(h), and group 2 if δ1 >
1
2 , 57
in panel ∧2(g)) experiences a reduction in the share of tolerant 58agents, x˙i < 0. Increasing intolerance in this group generates 59
more costs for tolerant agents of both groups, producing a grow- 60
ing intolerance in the other group as well. If δ1 = 12 the system 61
is described by panel ∧2(i). In the long run, at least one groupwill 62be entirely composed of intolerant agents.We conclude that be- 63
tween two different social groups of agents with the same pro- 64
ductivity, a conflict is inevitable. 65
A sufficient condition to have tolerance in both populations is 66
summarized in the following proposition: 67
Proposition 2. A sufficient condition for the spread of tolerance in 68
both groups at any starting point

x01, x
0
2
 ∈ F is γi < 0 ∀i = 1, 2, 69
that is 1/2 < Γ1 < δ1 < Γ2 < 1, where Γ1 = Ψ1 + βR2 and 70
Γ2 = Ψ2 − βR2 . 71
Proof. From panel ∧1(f) we observe that all trajectories converge to 72the point (1, 1) if γ1 < 0 and γ2 < 0. From γ1 < 0 we obtain δ1 > 73
1/2R11+β
R2
≡ Γ1 and from γ2 < 0 that δ1 < 1− 1/2R22+βR2 ≡ Γ2.  74
Note that Γ1 < Γ2 if and only if R2 (Ψ2 − Ψ1) > 2β , which 75
means that the spread of tolerance requires economic incentives 76
∧favouring inter-group interaction (Ψ1 < Ψ2, as stated in the nec- 77essary condition) and sufficiently low tolerance costs (small β). 78
Therefore, we can conclude that the diffusion of tolerance is very 79
difficult when social aversion to diversity becomes more marked. 80
3. Welfare and policy 81
We assume the amountW of expected payoffs of each agent as 82
a suitable measure of total welfare in the steady state Pj: 83
W(x1,x2) =
2
i=1

E[xi]Nixi + E[xˆi]Nixˆi

. (12) 84
When γ1 ∈ (0, 1) and γ2 ∈ (0, 1), then steady states P5 and P6 are 85
always unstable (see phase diagrams in Figs. 1 and 2) and ∧are not Q6 86taken into consideration in the welfare analysis. ∧In contrast, equi- 87librium points P1, P2, P3 and P4 can be stable or unstable according 88
to the values assumed by γ1 and γ2, and therefore, they constitute 89
the core of the welfare analysis.6 90
By substituting (4) and (5) into the welfare equation (12), and 91
assuming NiNi−1 ≈ 1, we obtain the following levels of welfare: 92
WP1 ≈ π22 (ψN2 − 1)− π11, (13) 93
WP2 ≈ π11 (ξN1 − 1)− π22, (14) 94
WP3 ≈ (π11 + π21)N1 + (π22 + π12)N2 − (π11 + π22) ; (15) 95
WP4 ≈ − (π11 + π22) . (16) 96
6 The assumption R11 > R2 > R22 rules out the ∧equilibrium point P7 .
6 R. Cerqueti et al. / Economics Letters xx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
From comparison we observe that1
WP3 > max{WP1 ,WP2 ,WP4}. (17)2
Therefore, welfare maximization requires total tolerance between3
the groups. Government policies must promote tolerance to max-4
imize welfare and ∧favour a fair distribution of wealth; however,5 since our model predicts a trade-off between wealth distribution6
and diffusion of tolerance, this can be a very hard task. Let ∧us as-7 sume, for example, that a population is formed by two conflicting8
groups with Ψ1 < Ψ2 and is characterized by a high level of intol-9
erance. In this case, a policymaker’s first objective should be that10
of satisfying condition (12) by favouring cultural integration, that11
is by reducing β , and maintaining inequality, so that the sufficient12
condition Γ1 < δ1 < Γ2 is satisfied. In this case, the dynamics are13
that of phase plane (f) in Fig. 1, where groups’ attitudes converge to14
full tolerance.When the state of the population is sufficiently close15
to the steady state point (1, 1), then we can realize economic inte-16
gration, reducing δ and the productivity gap between the groups17
(which is making Ψ1 ≈ 1/2 and Ψ2 = Ψ1 + ϵ), but ∧maintaining18 necessary condition Ψ1 < δ1 < Ψ2. At this point, dynamics will be19
described by one of the phase planes from ∧(a) to (e) in Fig. 1; dis-20 parities will be significantly reduced and tolerance will spread in21
both groups. It is important to remark the fact that a different pol-22
icy where economic integration precedes cultural integration does23
not produce social tolerance.24
4. Conclusions25
Usually we think that the tolerance between two different26
social groups is a natural consequence of economic integration,27
defined as fairer distribution of wealth among people. Our model28
contradicts this idea; in fact, even ∧though it confirms that a large29 gap between wealth endowments of different groups produces in-30
tolerance, when we assume no differences (R11 = R22 = R2) or31
impose fairness in the allocation of wealth produced by economic32
interaction (δ → 1/2), i.e. economic integration, we obtain the33
counterintuitive result that intolerance increases and aggregate34
wealth reduces. Thus, tolerance requires that a group must be35
richer than the other. However, such a phenomenon is reduced by36
sufficiently low tolerance costs; more precisely, when the percep-37
tion of diversity existing between the agents of different groups38
becomes negligible, these groups can freely cooperate in economic39
interactions without incurring in economic and social retaliation.40
By defining a society with low tolerance costs (β → 0) as cultur-41
ally integrated, we conclude that cultural integrationmust precede42
economic integration; fairness and equity without a corresponding43
decrease in the perception of diversity will produce intolerance.44
The conclusions derived from this analysis are solely based on the45
assumption of the existence of static wealth. In the real world, we46
observe that physical and human capital and production are dy-47
namic; therefore, future research will have to focus on the impact48
of ∧inter-group tolerance on economic growth models, where the49 mathematical law of motion of capital is also affected by the level50
of social tension.51
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